Reinforcing Regulatory Regimes: How States, Civil Society, and Codes of Conduct Promote Adherence to Global Labor Standards by Toffel, Michael Wayne et al.
 
Reinforcing Regulatory Regimes: How States, Civil Society, and
Codes of Conduct Promote Adherence to Global Labor Standards
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Toffel, Michael W., Jodi L Short, and Melissa Ouellet.
"Reinforcing Regulatory Regimes: How States, Civil Society, and
Codes of Conduct Promote Adherence to Global Labor
Standards." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–045,
November 2012.
Accessed February 19, 2015 10:54:05 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10018987
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP 
Copyright © 2012 by Michael W. Toffel, Jodi L. Short, and Melissa Ouellet 
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and 
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working 
papers are available from the author. 
 
 
Reinforcing Regulatory 
Regimes: How States, Civil 
Society, and Codes of 
Conduct Promote Adherence 
to Global Labor Standards  
 
Michael W. Toffel 
Jodi L. Short 
Melissa Ouellet 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
13-045 
 
November 20, 2012 
 1 
 
 
Reinforcing Regulatory Regimes: 
How States, Civil Society, and Codes of Conduct 
Promote Adherence to Global Labor Standards
† 
 
Michael W. Toffel 
Harvard Business School 
Boston, MA 02163 
mtoffel@hbs.edu  
 
Jodi L. Short 
University of California 
Hastings College of the Law 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
shortj@uchastings.edu 
Melissa Ouellet 
Harvard Business School 
Boston, MA 02163 
melissa.ouellet@gmail.com 
 
 
November 20, 2012 
 
In response to pressure from various stakeholders, many transnational businesses have developed 
codes of conduct and monitoring systems to ensure that working conditions in their supply chain 
factories meet global labor standards.  Many observers have questioned whether these codes of 
conduct have any impact on working conditions or are merely a marketing tool to deflect criticism 
of valuable global brands.  Using a proprietary dataset from one of the world’s largest social 
auditors, containing audit-level data for 31,915 audits of 14,922 establishments in 43 countries on 
behalf of 689 clients in 33 countries, we conduct one of the first large-scale comparative studies of 
adherence to labor codes of conduct to determine what combination of institutional conditions 
promotes compliance with the global labor standards embodied in codes.  We find that these 
private transnational governance tools are most effective when they are embedded in states that 
have made binding domestic and international legal commitments to protect workers’ rights and 
that have high levels of press freedom and nongovernmental organization activity.  Taken 
together, these findings suggest the importance of multiple, robust, overlapping, and reinforcing 
governance regimes to meaningful transnational regulation. 
 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are under increasing pressure from consumers, 
shareholders, activists, and governments to manage their global supply chains in ways that are 
environmentally sustainable and socially responsible.  Many businesses have developed private 
codes of conduct and monitoring systems to ensure that working conditions in their supplier 
factories meet global standards for protecting the rights of workers and their communities.  
Every Fortune 500 company in the United States has adopted a code of conduct for its suppliers 
(McBarnet, 2007), as have thousands of other global corporations, and many of these companies 
have retained private social auditors to verify compliance with the global standards embodied in 
their codes.  For instance, Gap Inc. has retained social auditors to monitor suppliers’ adherence 
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to its “Code of Vendor Conduct” that requires compliance with domestic labor and 
environmental laws and forbids child labor, forced labor, and other abusive or discriminatory 
labor practices.  Apple likewise contractually imposes a “Supplier Code of Conduct” on its 
suppliers and retained the Fair Labor Association, a nonprofit global monitoring organization, to 
enhance the monitoring of its supplier factories following activist pressure and media reports of 
widespread violations (Wingfield, 2012). 
Codes of conduct and private social monitoring have gained significance beyond the 
corporate boardrooms of global brands.  These governance tools have become the basis for a 
number of contemporary transnational regulatory regimes.  In response to perceived limitations 
or failures of traditional government regulation (Büthe, 2010; Vogel, 2008; O’Rourke, 2003), 
transnational regulatory regimes that once focused on influencing state policies to raise global 
standards for labor, environmental, and human rights have instead begun to emphasize private 
nongovernmental means of achieving these ends.  In 2000, the United Nations (UN) created the 
Global Compact, a set of widely accepted human rights, labor rights, and environmental 
sustainability norms to which corporations may voluntarily pledge their commitment (Lim and 
Tsutsui, 2012).  For many years after, the UN explored how it might expand traditional notions 
of international law to make certain human rights commitments binding on TNCs as well as 
states.  However, in 2008, the UN abandoned its attempts to legally bind corporations and 
instead adopted the “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, which clarifies that although 
states have binding duties under international law to “protect” human rights, corporations have 
the softer nonbinding “responsibility” to “respect” human rights.  According to the UN Human 
Rights Council, this means that corporations should “act with due diligence to avoid infringing 
on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts that occur” (Ruggie, 2010:1).  Corporate 3 
 
codes of conduct, and their enforcement through private social monitoring, are key governance 
mechanisms for implementing these and other transnational regulatory regimes (Shamir, 2005). 
The shift to corporate governance as a primary mechanism for raising global standards 
for labor, environmental, and human rights springs from the perception that, in many contexts, 
TNCs may have more capacity than states do to influence the behavior of their supplier factories 
(Scott, 2010; O’Rourke, 2003).  However, the shift from the state is far from complete.  Several 
studies have demonstrated the ongoing relevance of states and domestic regulatory institutions to 
the implementation of private transnational regulatory regimes.  Tim Bartley, for instance, details 
how local political and institutional conditions impeded the implementation of private 
transnational labor and environmental certification regimes in Indonesia (Bartley, 2010).  Cesar 
Rodríguez-Garavito shows how state intervention shaped the resolution of disputes over code 
compliance in Mexico and Guatemala (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005).  Richard Locke and his 
colleagues have similarly documented distinct pathways of code implementation in Mexico, 
where private codes largely substituted for ineffective government regulation, and in the Czech 
Republic, where private codes built upon and complemented national labor legislation (Locke, 
Rissing, and Pal, 2012).  
While studies like these have demonstrated the importance of institutional environments 
in shaping outcomes at particular firms, they have shed little light on the precise constellation of 
institutional conditions that fosters or predicts adherence to privately imposed transnational labor 
standards (Vogel, 2008; Büthe, 2010).  The literature on private transnational regulatory regimes 
primarily addresses their adoption or diffusion (Wetterberg, 2011; Prakash and Potoski, 2006; 
Bartley, 2007a, 2007b; Campbell, 2007; Hoffman, 2001).  Those studies that have attempted to 
assess outcomes have been mostly qualitative, based on intensive case studies of a small number 4 
 
of firms in a single country, industry, or supply chain (e.g., Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005; Locke 
and Romis, 2007; Locke, Rissing, and Pal, 2012; Kocer and Fransen, 2009).   
Our study seeks to fill these gaps in the literature that have been “crying out for more 
systematic analysis” (Büthe, 2010:9).  First, it provides among the first broad-based, systematic 
comparative studies of compliance with private codes of conduct.  Our study includes 
establishments in 11 industries in 43 countries.  The scope of our data enables us to conduct the 
first evaluation of code adherence across a wide range of institutional environments, including 
public, private, domestic, and international regulatory regimes.  Second, we assess not only the 
direct impact that various governance regimes have on code adherence, but also their interactive 
effects.  Private transnational regulation is embedded in complex layers of governance emanating 
from a range of actors and sources of authority; it is crucial to understand how these institutions 
might enhance, neutralize, or undermine one another (Eberlein et al., 2012).  Finally, we examine 
how code adherence is affected by institutions not only in the supplier-factory’s country, but also 
in the buyer’s country.  In doing so, our work builds on an extensive literature that examines how 
local institutions affect factory labor conditions (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005; Locke and Romis, 
2007; Kocer and Fransen, 2009; Locke, Rissing, and Pal, 2012) and links this to a separate 
literature that describes how activist and consumer pressure has prompted TNCs to adopt codes 
of compliance and other corporate responsibility measures (Hendry, 2006; King, 2008; Chatterji 
and Listokin, 2007; Lenox and Eesley, 2009; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Jira and Toffel, 2013).  Our 
study is among the first to examine whether the institutional conditions in developed markets 
affect labor conditions in TNCs’ supply chains in developing markets.   
Our findings substantially advance understandings of how institutional environments 
shape compliance with private transnational governance regimes.  First, by demonstrating how 5 
 
states create domestic environments that promote adherence to the global standards embodied in 
codes of conduct, we advance the argument that states have an important role to play in 
transnational private regulatory regimes.  We find that adherence to private labor standards is 
highest in countries that are closely tied to international institutions, as evidenced by their 
ratification of many labor treaties.  We also find high adherence to codes in states that maintain 
high levels of press freedom.  Second, we demonstrate that governance institutions are not 
fungible substitutes for one another, but rather they interact in complex ways, sometimes 
amplifying one another’s effects on TNCs and their global suppliers.  For instance, while the 
stringency of domestic employment laws in supplier-factory countries has no independent effect 
on private code compliance, it enhances the effect of treaty adoption.  That is, in countries that 
have ratified more labor treaties, the existence of stringent domestic labor regulation promotes 
even greater code adherence.  Similarly, while the presence in a country of many international 
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) had no overall direct impact on factories’ adherence to 
codes of conduct, it does amplify the protective effects of press freedom.  Third, we demonstrate 
that there are institutional spillover effects from a buyer-country to a supplier-country.  TNCs 
headquartered in countries where the issue of supply-chain labor abuse is particularly salient tend 
to work with suppliers that adhere more to the global labor standards embodied in codes of 
conduct.  Taken together, these findings point the way toward building more effective private 
transnational regulatory regimes. 
Corporate Codes of Conduct:  Symbol or Substance? 
Technological and economic developments in the late twentieth century, including trade 
liberalization, the turn to neoliberal government policies, and the globalization of production and 
finance, have rendered many states less willing or able to regulate corporate conduct in global 6 
 
markets.  But these developments have not dampened the demand for more “rules of the game” 
to mitigate some of the harmful impacts of global capitalism (Jenkins, 2001:1).  Instead, the 
locus of rule creation, diffusion, and enforcement has shifted from governments to private parties 
and to TNCs themselves, which are increasingly regulating their global supply chains through 
private means (George, 2007; Jenkins, 2001).   
Codes of conduct are a common tool for private regulation of supply chains.  All U.S. 
Fortune 500 companies and thousands of other major TNCs have adopted codes governing labor 
and environmental standards and human rights in their supply chains (McBarnet, 2007).  These 
corporate codes are imposed through supply contracts that stipulate not only transactional terms 
such as price, quantity, delivery, and quality, but also social, environmental, and human rights 
standards of production processes.  The substantive features of these TNC codes are highly 
consistent, usually invoking broad international consensus standards such as those of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). They also typically call for the supplier to comply with 
domestic labor, environmental, and human rights laws and specifically forbid practices such as 
child labor and prison labor, even if such practices are legal in the supplier’s country or are 
prohibited only by unenforced laws (McBarnet and Kurkchiyan, 2007).  Many TNCs have taken 
the additional step of hiring private social auditors to monitor their suppliers’ adherence to their 
codes. 
Contractually imposed codes of conduct hold both promise and peril as transnational 
governance mechanisms.  On the one hand, some have argued that such codes can bring new 
voices into the regulatory process and can develop new mechanisms to motivate improvements 
for workers and the environment (Courville, 2003; Schrage, 2004).  On the other hand, some fear 
that private codes of conduct will undermine the state’s role in industrial policy—“leaving 7 
 
businesses to shape regulation according to their own liking” (Kocer and Fransen, 2009:238)—
and that they place a veneer of legitimacy over business practices that actually compromise 
rather than promote health, safety, and human rights (Banerjee, 2007). Such concerns have led 
many to dismiss corporate codes of conduct as “a farce” (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005:212) or a 
“marketing device” that exacerbates global inequities of social power (Shamir, 2005:109).  
Unfortunately, these polarized and largely theoretical assertions have shed little light on how the 
codes actually operate in practice and under what circumstances they are most likely to work. 
Ascertaining the impact of corporate codes of conduct is necessary not only to understand private 
transnational labor regulation, but also to inform broader normative debates about corporate 
social responsibility (CSR).  The ethics of engaging in CSR activities depend, at least in part, on 
whether such corporate interventions can mitigate the problems they seek to address (Margolis 
and Walsh, 2003).  Our research aims to give companies the tools with which to assess where 
their attempts at private, contractual labor regulation are most likely to be successful. 
Corporate codes of conduct adopted by TNCs bear all the hallmarks of hollow 
symbolism.  First, TNCs often adopt codes of conduct under circumstances typically associated 
with a lack of commitment or capacity to implement them effectively, such as in response to 
pressure from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), shareholders, or governments (Moon and 
Vogel, 2008; Schrage, 2004).  But research has suggested that corporations are unlikely to follow 
through on “voluntary” commitments adopted primarily to deflect direct outside threats (Short 
and Toffel, 2010).  The vast scale and rapid spread of code adoption suggests that much of it 
results from mimetic diffusion processes, as “managers seek to act in ways that are deemed 
appropriate by other managers and significant actors in their environment” (Campbell, 
2007:958).  Over the last two decades, prominent sources of corporate governance norms—such 8 
 
as business schools, leading business publications, and high-status corporations—have advanced 
the importance of socially responsible corporate behavior (Campbell, 2007), transforming CSR 
“from heresy to dogma” (Hoffman, 2001).  In response, most major TNCs have adopted a code 
of conduct governing supply chain factories (Kolk and van Tulder, 2005).  Although such 
mimetic pressures may increase the number of TNCs formally adopting codes of conduct 
(Wetterberg, 2011), research suggests that codes adopted under these conditions are highly likely 
to be symbolic gestures rather than substantive commitments (Meyer et al., 1997).   
Second, codes of conduct are especially likely to be decoupled from corporate practices 
and priorities because the obligations they purport to impose conflict with TNCs’ efficiency-
oriented task objectives (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  The globalization of supply chains is 
motivated by price competition.  Firms in more developed countries procure goods manufactured 
in less developed countries to take competitive advantage of low wages and regulatory costs.  
Raising the cost of labor by adhering to standards imposed by codes of conduct seems to belie a 
fundamental logic of the global supply chain. 
Third, the constituencies whose interests are protected by codes of conduct— primarily 
production workers in developing countries—are far removed from the powerful decision-
makers in most TNCs.  Organizations are more likely to observe fragile, non-efficiency-related 
normative commitments when those commitments are supported by constituencies within the 
organization that have a reasonable amount of power as well as access and proximity to key 
decision makers (Rees, 1988; Selznick, 1992; Parker, 2002).  Workers in far-flung global supply 
chain factories have no such power and have no such access to the corporate headquarters that 
impose these governance structures. 9 
 
Finally, code violations are largely invisible to outsiders.  Research suggests that 
corporations are more likely to live up to their voluntary commitments when their activities—
and transgressions—are visible to outside monitors (Short and Toffel, 2010; Toffel, 2008; 
Potoski and Prakash, 2005).  The supply chain factories where code-of-conduct violations may 
occur are numerous and widely dispersed, their identities are often kept confidential by the 
brands that they supply, and they are often subject to little regulatory oversight in their home 
countries.  It is therefore easy for both TNCs and their suppliers to hide code violations.  In fact, 
several studies have demonstrated that corporate codes of conduct did little to improve factory 
conditions (Locke, Qin, and Brause, 2007; Esbenshade, 2004) and that there is often a significant 
gap between the rhetoric of voluntary codes and the reality of labor and environmental 
conditions (Esbenshade, 2004; Greenfield, 1997; Locke and Romis, 2007). 
Despite such obstacles, there are reasons to believe that TNCs and their suppliers will, 
under some circumstances, adhere to their nonbinding commitments.  First, literature suggests 
that even when auditing is adopted symbolically, it has governance effects that shape 
organizational practices and priorities.  Orts (1995), for instance, describes how environmental 
auditing systems construct internal decision-making structures and routines that embed 
environmental impacts into managers’ considerations.  Research suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
financial auditing requirements have changed corporate practices dramatically (Wagner and 
Dittmar, 2006; Schmidt and Raman, 2012) and that formal commitments to conduct internal 
audits can lead to improved regulatory compliance (Toffel and Short, 2011).  In these types of 
regulatory design, auditing is not merely a technical tool for verifying objective facts, but an 
attempt “to re-order the collective and individual selves that make up organizational life” 
(Power, 1997:42) in a way that will “connect the inner workings of companies to wider public 10 
 
demands for control” (Power, 1997:65).  Similar claims have been made for codes of conduct 
and the social auditing that often accompanies them. 
Second, monitoring and other types of compliance pressure can come from many kinds of 
external source (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; McCaffrey and Hart, 1998; Parker, 2002).  
Government pressure, in the form of either surveillance (Short and Toffel, 2010) or the prospect 
of more stringent public regulation (Lyon and Maxwell, 2007; Moon and Vogel, 2008), can 
prompt firms to live up to their voluntary commitments.  INGOs can be a source of surveillance 
and political pressure prompting corporations to comply (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Eesley 
and Lenox, 2006; Reid and Toffel, 2009).  Research has suggested that unions (Pfeifer, 
Stefanski, and Grether, 1976) and the media (Dyck and Zingales, 2002) can also serve important 
monitoring functions.  Many have posited that these civil society institutions play a key role in 
enhancing the efficacy of private transnational governance regimes (Fung, O’Rourke, and Sabel, 
2001; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2001; Abbott and Snidal, 2009). 
While these theoretical frameworks provide useful insight into the universe of factors that 
comprise successful transnational governance, they fail to explain the substantial variation in 
compliance with codes of conduct that has been observed. Rather than take the view that codes 
of conduct are either bogus or bona fide, we investigate the conditions associated with greater (or 
lesser) adherence to codes. 
There is broad agreement that the efficacy of private monitoring depends, in part, on the 
characteristics of the institutional regime in which it is embedded (Vogel, 2010).  As John 
Campbell (2007:963) notes, “[I]nstitutions are critical, especially if we are concerned with 
ensuring that corporations actually behave in socially responsible ways, rather than just pay 
rhetorical lip service to the issue.” Private transnational regulation is embedded in multiple, 11 
 
cross-cutting institutional regimes.  As discussed above, pressure to comply with legally 
unenforceable transnational norms can come from a variety of actors, from governments to 
private actors such as NGOs, unions, and consumers.  To date, research on private transnational 
regulation has not attempted to address the multiple layers of governance at play.  Below, we 
theorize how particular transnational and national government institutions, as well as civil 
society institutions in the supplier’s and buyer’s countries, encourage suppliers to adhere to the 
global labor standards embodied in privately imposed corporate codes of conduct.   
Government Institutions and Private Code Compliance  
Despite questions about the capacity of states to regulate transnational risks, research 
suggests that domestic regulatory environments help determine the effects of private regulatory 
efforts (Seidman, 2007).  Locke, Qin, and Brause (2007), for instance, found better compliance 
with private labor standards among establishments in countries with strong rule-of-law norms.  
By contrast, Kocer and Fransen (2009) found, in a study of Turkish factories, that private codes 
of conduct did little to promote workers’ freedom-of-association rights because domestic law 
reinforced power imbalances between employers and workers.   
A country’s labor regulation may derive from domestic law, international law, or some 
combination of the two.  States administer domestic legal regimes governing employment 
relationships and workplace conditions.  Some countries’ labor and employment laws are more 
protective of workers than others.  Domestic studies have demonstrated that companies are more 
likely to adopt self-regulation and implement it effectively when they are embedded in robust 
governmental regulatory regimes (Short and Toffel, 2008; Short and Toffel, 2010; Rivera, 2004; 
Rivera, DeLeon, and Koerber, 2006) and it is often argued that private transnational regulation is 
more effective when it is supported by credible state regulation (Vogel, 2010; Kocer and 12 
 
Fransen, 2009; Büthe, 2010).  Factories embedded in more stringent domestic legal 
environments are likely to develop experience complying with protective labor laws and should 
thus find it easier and cheaper than other factories do to develop the organizational capabilities 
and normative orientation necessary to implement the transnational labor standards embodied in 
private codes of conduct.   We therefore propose:   
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  Suppliers in countries with highly protective labor law will exhibit 
greater adherence to labor codes of conduct than suppliers elsewhere. 
 
In addition to enacting domestic law, many states have entered into binding international 
treaty regimes governing labor rights.  The ILO is the intergovernmental organization and treaty 
regime governing global labor standards.  It brings together stakeholders from governments, 
labor unions, and businesses to articulate broad principles and consensus standards for the 
protection of labor rights, including working hours, worker health and safety, child labor, and 
workers’ freedom of association.  These principles are contained in various ILO conventions that 
a governmental ILO member may elect to ratify as legally binding in its country.  The ILO 
monitors its member governments’ compliance with these conventions and provides compliance 
assistance to national regulators. 
Treaties represent an important source of global norm diffusion and pressure to comply 
with international consensus standards (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012; Risse and Sikkink, 1999; Meyer 
et al., 1997).  There is a vigorous and longstanding debate in the international relations and 
international law literatures about whether treaties are associated with the behavior of the 
governments that ratify them (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Goldsmith and Posner, 2005; 
Hathaway, 2005; Kelley, 2007; Koskenniemi, 2011; Sachleben, 2006; Simmons, 2009).  We 
address a different question—whether treaty adoption by host governments is associated with the 
behavior of private companies within those states.   13 
 
An emerging literature has begun to examine this, but has produced no clear answers.  
Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005), for instance, suggest that human rights treaties may enhance 
the efficacy of human rights INGOs by supplying a set of norms that these organizations can 
draw upon to pressure governments to comply.  They document separately the inefficacy of 
human rights treaties and the efficacy of human rights INGOs in reducing human rights 
violations, but their data do not demonstrate a relationship between treaties and INGOs.  Lim and 
Tsutsui (2012) hypothesize that companies in countries with significant treaty obligations would 
be more likely to adopt the United Nations Global Compact, which asks companies to publicly 
declare their commitment to “universally accepted principles” regarding labor, human rights, the 
environment, and anticorruption, but the authors’ results did not support that hypothesis.   
In the context of global labor standards, we argue that labor treaty adoption by a host 
government reflects a domestic environment that encourages companies’ adherence to private 
codes of conduct because the public and private governance regimes are mutually reinforcing.  
Codes of conduct are private instruments that seek to provide a means of enforcing compliance 
with global labor standards like those embodied in ILO treaties (McBarnet and Kurkchiyan, 
2007).  TNCs often enforce these codes by engaging third-party auditors to monitor their 
suppliers’ adherence, with implicit or explicit penalties for non-adherence.  These private 
contractual arrangements provide a source of enforcement pressure lacking in many public 
international treaty regimes (Hathaway, 2005; Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004; Hafner-Burton and 
Tsutsui, 2005).  What private codes may lack, however, is legitimacy, being subject to criticism 
as undemocratic and illegitimate attempts to impose norms favored by powerful international 
actors (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007).  Such concerns are less salient in countries that have 
publicly bound themselves to a similar set of norms through treaty ratification.  A significant 14 
 
body of international law literature argues that treaties can be instruments of norm construction 
and diffusion (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse and Sikkink, 1999; Chayes and Chayes, 1995; 
Goodman and Jinks, 2004).  In short, we expect that international treaty obligations and private 
codes of conduct will be mutually reinforcing.  We therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2):  Suppliers in countries that have ratified more labor treaties will 
exhibit greater adherence to labor codes of conduct than suppliers elsewhere.  
Treaty obligations and domestic law do not operate in isolation from one another.  In fact, 
because treaties typically have broad precatory language and weak enforcement mechanisms, 
their normative goals often can only be realized through the enactment of domestic law by 
ratifying governments (Koskenniemi, 2011).  As Simmons (2009:12) notes, “[h]uman rights 
treaties matter most where they have domestic political and legal traction.”  Moreover, treaties 
can empower domestic political actors who support the global norms embodied in those treaties.  
For example, “[t]reaties set visible goals for public policy and practice that alter political 
coalitions and the strength, clarity and legitimacy of their demands” (Simmons, 2009:12).  In this 
way, treaties can shape the domestic political landscape in ways that promote the adoption of 
legislation to implement global standards.  In countries that adopt labor treaties and operate 
strong domestic legal regimes governing labor, private labor codes reinforce the prevailing 
norms and legal enforcement mechanisms.  Consequently, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3):  Labor law and labor treaties are reinforcing mechanisms such that 
suppliers in countries that have both enacted highly protective labor law and ratified more 
labor treaties will exhibit greater adherence to labor codes of conduct than suppliers in 
countries with only one of these features. 
 
Supplier-Country Civil Society Institutions and Private Code Compliance 
The literature on self-regulation and corporate social responsibility envisions private third 
parties such as INGOs, unions, and the press as “a counterbalance to corporate power” 
(Campbell, 2007:958).  A substantial literature suggests that INGOs can act as diffusers, 15 
 
monitors, and even enforcers of global norms, with the power to impose penalties on firms that 
fail to adhere to normative commitments (Vogel, 2010; Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Braithwaite, 1997; Sabel and Simon, 2012; Fung, O’Rourke, and Sabel, 2001).  Lim and Tsutsui 
(2012) consider INGOs to be an important source of normative pressure compelling corporations 
to adopt the United Nations Global Compact and demonstrate that corporations are more likely 
to do so in countries with many INGOs.  Seidman (2007) documents how the monitoring efforts 
of INGOs enabled the Rugmark certification system to police child labor in the Indian carpet 
industry.  Many have observed the power of INGOs to “punish” companies that fail to adhere to 
global standards through “naming and shaming” campaigns (Fransen, 2012; Vogel, 2010; Soule, 
2009; Seidman, 2007).  Because INGOs can serve critical governance functions such as 
generating, monitoring, and enforcing norms, we propose: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4):  Suppliers in countries with more INGOs will exhibit greater 
adherence to labor codes of conduct than suppliers elsewhere. 
The media is another civil society institution that can provide regulatory pressure on 
factories. By monitoring and reporting on their behaviors, the press subjects companies “to the 
constant threat of public exposure” (Campbell, 2007:958).  Companies’ desire to maintain a 
positive media image (King, 2008) can exert strong regulatory effects on their behavior (Soule, 
2009).  Negative publicity can damage a company’s reputation with consumers and diminish 
brand value (Vogel, 2010).  Research has also shown that press coverage influences institutional 
investors and equity analysts more than many factors that receive significantly more attention in 
academic debates, including a company’s board structure, auditors, and relationship with 
regulators (Low, Seetharaman, and Poon, 2002).   The threat of substantial reputational penalties 
from negative media coverage of poor CSR practices can bolster companies’ commitment to 16 
 
enforce CSR norms (Dyck and Zingales, 2002).  Because this threat is greater in domains with 
more press freedom, we propose: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5):  Suppliers in countries with more press freedom will exhibit greater 
adherence to labor codes of conduct than suppliers elsewhere. 
 
A free press can also be leveraged by other civil society actors to increase regulatory 
pressures on companies.  For instance, a free press can facilitate INGOs’ ability to discover and 
publicize supply-chain labor abuse (Fransen, 2012), generating pressure on companies to 
improve their governance practices (Dyck and Zingales, 2002; Baron, 2003).  Journalists and 
INGOs often work together to discover companies’ practices (Dyck and Zingales, 2002), 
enhancing overall civil-society monitoring capacity.  Research has shown that companies are 
more likely to concede to activists’ demands on issues that receive a great deal of media 
coverage (King, 2008).  For all these reasons, the press is central to the collective action 
strategies of many international labor NGOs (King, 2008; Braithwaite, 1997; Fransen, 2012). We 
therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The positive influence of press freedom on suppliers’ adherence to 
labor codes of conduct will be enhanced in countries with more INGOs. 
 
Buyer-Country Civil Society Institutions and Private Code Compliance 
TNCs are highly sensitive to brand reputation and consumer opinion (Vogel, 2010; 
Ruggie, 2003; Soule, 2009; Klein,2002).  To protect themselves from negative publicity that 
might damage their image, TNCs often accede to the demands of mobilized consumers and 
activists to implement environmental and CSR measures such as codes of conduct (Fransen, 
2012; King, 2008; Lenox and Eesley, 2009; Peretti and Micheletti, 2004).  Often the mere threat 
of reputational damage, even without actual political mobilization, will cause a TNC to accede to 
such demands (Reid and Toffel, 2009; Soule, 2009).  We argue that the potential for political 17 
 
mobilization in TNCs’ domestic markets will similarly influence the way they implement the 
CSR measures they adopt.   
Among the most important prerequisites to mobilizing anti-corporate activism is the 
framing of supply chain labor abuse in a way that generates a shared set of understandings and 
concerns about the issue among consumers and other stakeholders (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and 
Benford, 1988; Zald, 1996; King, 2008).  The media, of course, play a key role in framing issues 
for a mass audience.  Research has shown that exposure to an issue via the media can increase 
public concern about the issue (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Page and Shapiro, 1989; Szasz, 
1994) and that this shared concern can lead to political mobilization (McCarthy, Smith, and Zald, 
1996; Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996).  Accordingly, activists have used the media to amplify 
reports of supply-chain labor abuse, increasing the potential for mobilization and heightening 
consumer concern about the issue (Fransen 2012).  Such concerns can also spill over to the 
company’s employees, senior managers, and owners who do not want to be associated with an 
organization stigmatized by such reports. The potential for mobilization may be especially strong 
when the media coverage on supply chains depicts highly dramatic forms of abuse, such as child 
labor, which have “clear protagonists and visible effects” (McCarthy et al., 1996:295), making 
the issue highly salient.  We thus expect that TNCs based in domains where the issue of supply-
chain labor abuse is particularly salient—and thus the risk of reputational damage and consumer 
mobilization is high—will be especially cautious in selecting and monitoring their suppliers’ 
factories.  We therefore propose:  
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Establishments supplying buyers in countries where the issue of 
supply-chain labor abuse is particularly salient will exhibit greater adherence to labor 
codes of conduct than suppliers elsewhere. 
 18 
 
Data and Measures 
We obtained, from one of the world’s largest social auditors, a proprietary dataset including 
audit-level data for every code-of-conduct audit the firm conducted from 2004 through 2009.  To 
avoid undue influence of atypical audits, we excluded audits from countries with fewer than 30 
audits over the five-year sample. This resulted in a sample of 31,915 audits of 14,922 supplier 
establishments in 43 countries on behalf of 689 clients in 33 countries. The geographic 
composition of our sample is reported in Table 1. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------------ 
Dependent Variable  
To assess the extent to which factories comply with private codes of conduct, we 
calculated the number of labor violations from the social auditor database. This is the number of 
code-of-conduct violations the social auditor identified in the following areas: child labor, forced 
or compulsory labor, working hours, occupational health and safety, minimum wage, 
disciplinary practices, right of association, right to organize and bargain collectively, treatment 
of foreign workers and subcontractors, and dormitory conditions.  Each of these domains 
includes a host of subcategories; for example, the occupational health and safety category 
includes items on emergency preparedness (7 items), fire safety (5 items), the canteen (2 items), 
toilets (8 items), and the work floor (8 items). The latter subcategory includes improper chemical 
storage, improper medical waste disposal, inadequate lighting, inadequate ventilation, lack of 
personal protective equipment, lack of chemical safety data sheets, unsafe electrical conditions, 
and unsafe machinery. To avoid undue influence of outliers, we winsorized (top-coded) this 19 
 
variable at the 99th percentile value of 28 violations. Figure 1 is a histogram of the number of 
labor violations. 
Independent Variables 
Factory-Country Employment Laws and Norms. For each country hosting a factory in 
the dataset, we calculated employment laws index, a measure of the country’s labor protection 
and employment laws, obtained from Botero et al. (2004). This index incorporates legal 
protections of (1) part-time and fixed-term employment contracts, (2) maximum hours and 
premium wages for overtime, (3) severance pay and penalties, and (4) dismissal procedures.   
To measure a factory country’s proclaimed dedication to international labor protections, 
we used the number of labor treaties each country had ratified by each year. We obtained this 
data from the Database of International Labor Standards maintained by the International Labor 
Organization.
1  To reduce skew in our models, we use the log (after adding 1) of this count. 
Factory-Country Civil Society Institutions.  We measure the extent of activist pressure 
in the country in which the audited factory operates as the annual number of international 
nongovernmental organizations in that country (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). We obtained these data 
from the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations, 2004 
through 2009). Like Lim and Tsutsui (2012), we focus on international organizations categorized 
as Cluster I by the Union of International Associations, which includes federations of 
international organizations, universal membership organizations, and intercontinental 
membership organizations. To reduce skew, we use the log of the number of INGOs. 
We measure the extent to which the audited establishment’s country provides press 
freedom each year via the annual Press Freedom Index, produced by Reporters without Borders,
2 
                                                 
1 This database is available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm (accessed January 2012). 
2 These data are available at http://en.rsf.org (accessed January 2012). 20 
 
which scores countries on a host of factors, including direct and indirect threats to journalists; 
imprisonment of and physical attacks on journalists; censorship and self-censorship; legal, 
economic, and administrative pressure; and the number of journalists detained, murdered, and 
physically attacked or threatened. We reverse-coded this index so that higher scores represent 
more press freedom and rescaled press freedom to range from 0 to 1. 
Buyer-Country Civil Society Institutions. To assess the pressure that buyer organizations 
face on labor issues in their supply chains, we developed a measure of issue salience in the buyer 
country by counting for each country the annual number of newspaper articles in the 
LEXIS/NEXIS database that mentioned the term “child labor” and that appeared in a newspaper 
based in that country. To reduce skew, we used the log (after adding one) of these annual 
national tallies.  
Control Variables 
To control for the level of economic development in each factory’s country, we obtained 
annual data on GDP [gross domestic product] per capita in 2005 dollars from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
3 To reduce skew, we use the log of 
GDP per capita in our models.  
We measured the extent to which the factory country’s government provides an effective 
regulatory environment via the annual government effectiveness index, created by the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project (World Bank, 2011) to capture “perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies.”
  
                                                 
3 These data are available at http://www.ers.usda.gov (accessed January 2012). 21 
 
Because governmental and other institutions might influence the private sector differently 
in developed versus developing countries, we create a dummy variable, OECD, to distinguish 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries from 
developing countries (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012).
4 
To control for economic incentives that might affect the intensity of the audit, we 
obtained information from the social auditor on who had paid for each audit. We created three 
dummy variables (audit paid by buyer; audit paid by vendor, agent, or licensee; and audit paid 
by factory), coded “1” when each of these actors paid and coded “0” otherwise.
5  
To control for the possibility that an audit’s emphasis might be affected by the use of 
third-party protocols, we created the dichotomous variable, third-party audit protocol.  To 
control for the size and complexity of the factory being audited, we used the audit staff hours 
required for the audit,
6 which we calculated as the product of the audit length (in hours) and the 
number of inspectors assigned to the audit, both of which were obtained from the social auditor’s 
database. To reduce skew, we used the log (after adding 1) of audit staff hours in our models. 
To control for differences in the prevalence of violations across industries, we derived 
information from the social auditor’s database about each factory’s industry and coded a full set 
of industry dummy variables for accessories; building materials; chemicals and plastics; 
electronics; food, agriculture, and beverage; footwear; furniture; garments; metal products; 
paper, printing, and publishing; services; or toys.  
                                                 
4 OECD member countries are listed on the OECD website: 
http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm (accessed 
August 2012). 
5 We also created a dummy variable to indicate the subset of audits for which the payer was not coded in the social 
auditor’s database. 
6 Alternative measures of factory size were unavailable, as the social auditor’s database lacked information about 
factory size and our efforts to match the factories to the Capital IQ and WorldScope datasets yielded very few 
matches. 22 
 
Table 2 reports the distribution of industries in our sample. Table 3 reports countries in 
each third of the sample distribution of employment laws index and number of labor treaties. 
Table 4 reports summary statistics and correlations. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 2 – 4 here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Methods and Results 
We estimate the following model: 
Vijkt = Ejt + CSIjt + Bkt + Xijt + eijkt, 
where Vijkt refers to the number of labor violations identified in the audit of factory i in country j 
in year t on behalf of a buyer in country k. Ejt refers to employment laws and norms in factory 
country j in year t and represents employment laws index and number of labor treaties. CSIjt 
refers to civil society institutions in factory country j in year t and represents international 
nongovernmental organizations and press freedom. Bkt refers to buyer pressures in buyer country 
k in year t and represents issue salience in the buyer country. Xijt refers to all controls and 
includes GDP per capita, government effectiveness index, OECD, audit paid by buyer, audit 
paid by vendor, agent, or licensee (audit paid by factory is the omitted category), third-party 
audit protocol, audit staff hours, and full sets of industry dummies and year dummies. eijkt is the 
error term.  
We use centered versions of all variables that we subsequently use in interaction terms: 
employment laws index, number of labor treaties, international nongovernmental organizations, 
and press freedom. Because the dependent variable is a count variable that exhibits 
overdispersion, with a 5.9 ratio of the variance (41.0) to the mean (7.0), we estimate the model 23 
 
using negative binomial regression.  Because many of our variables are measured at the country-
year level, we cluster standard errors by country.  
Regression results of our primary model are reported in Column 1of Table 5 both as 
coefficients and as average marginal effects (AME). We begin by interpreting the controls. 
Audits of establishments in wealthier countries, as measured by GDP per capita, revealed fewer 
violations. Audits paid for by the buyer or by a third party (the vendor, agent, or licensee) 
resulted in more violations than audits paid for by the supplier (the omitted category). Audits of 
larger and more complex establishments, as indicated by requiring more audit staff hours, 
revealed more violations.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 here 
------------------------------------------ 
Turning to the hypothesized variables, we found no evidence that employment laws had a 
significant direct effect on violations; our results do not support H1. Significantly fewer 
violations were found at establishments in countries with more labor treaties (Column 1: = – 
0.199, p < 0.01), supporting H2. A one-standard-deviation increase in number of labor treaties 
(log) is associated with -0.95 fewer violations (calculated as 1 SD * AME = 0.68 * -1.40).   
Our second model includes an interaction term between employment laws index and 
number of labor treaties (log).  The significant negative coefficient on this interaction term 
supports H3 (Column 2: = – 0.851, p < 0.01). To interpret this moderated relationship, Figure 2 
plots average predicted values of number of labor violations associated with audits conducted in 
countries with various numbers of labor treaties. The declining slope of both lines indicates 
fewer code-of-conduct labor violations in countries with more labor treaties. The dashed line’s 
steeper negative slope indicates that such violations decline more rapidly with labor treaties in 
countries that also have more robust employment laws (that is, above-median employment laws 24 
 
index) than in countries with less robust employment laws.
7 The significant coefficient on the 
interaction term indicates a statistically significant difference between the slopes of these two 
declining lines.  
We found no evidence that activist pressure, as measured by international 
nongovernmental organizations (log), was associated with fewer labor violations; our results do 
not support H4. Contrary to our prediction, the average effect is positive, an anomaly we explore 
below as an extension.  
Returning to the results of model 1, significantly fewer violations were found at 
establishments in countries with more press freedom (Column 1: = – 0.921, p < 0.01), which 
supports H5. A one-standard-deviation increase in press freedom is associated with 1.8 fewer 
violations (calculated as 1 SD * AME = 0.28 * -6.49).   
Our third model includes an interaction term between press freedom and international 
nongovernmental organizations (log).  The significant negative coefficient on this interaction 
term supports H6 (Column 3: = – 0.678, p < 0.05). To interpret this moderated relationship, 
Figure 3 plots average predicted values of number of labor violations associated with audits 
conducted in countries with varying levels of press freedom. The declining slope of both lines 
indicates fewer code-of-conduct labor violations in countries with more press freedom. The 
dashed line’s steeper negative slope indicates that such violations decline more rapidly with 
press freedom in countries that have more international nongovernmental organizations.  The 
significant coefficient on the interaction indicates a statistically significant difference between 
the slopes of these two declining lines. 
                                                 
7 For context, note the intercepts of the two lines in Figure 2. For countries with less employment law (below-
median employment law index), the average predicted number of violations ranges from 11.0 with minimal labor 
treaties to just over half that amount, 6.5, when labor treaties are at the sample maximum.  For countries with more 
labor laws (above-median), the corresponding range is 12.3 with minimal labor treaties to nearly one-third that 
amount, 4.2, with labor treaties at the sample maximum. 25 
 
Significantly fewer violations were found in audits conducted for buyers in countries 
where child labor in supply chains was a more salient issue (Column 1: = – 0.194, p < 0.01), 
supporting H7. A one-standard-deviation increase in the issue salience in the buyer’s country is 
associated with 3.7 fewer violations (calculated as 1 SD * AME = 2.73 * – 1.36).   
Extension 
Finding no evidence that activist pressure was directly associated with fewer violations, 
we explored whether this result might be cloaking heterogeneous effects.  We reestimated our 
primary model but also included an interaction term between international nongovernmental 
organizations (log) and OECD. The results, reported in Table 5, Column 4, yielded a statistically 
significant negative coefficient on the interaction term (= – 0.892, p < 0.01). To interpret this 
result, Figure 4 plots average predicted values of number of labor violations associated with 
audits conducted in countries at varying levels of international nongovernmental organizations 
(log). The declining dashed line indicates fewer labor violations in OECD member countries as 
the number of international nongovernmental organizations (log) increases, as H3 predicts. The 
slightly rising solid line indicates the opposite relationship in non-OECD countries, a 
relationship that warrants further research and might reflect a selection effect; that is, developing 
countries with more problematic working conditions might attract more INGOs. The significant 
coefficient on the interaction indicates a significant difference between the slopes of these two 
lines.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our findings substantially advance understandings of how institutional environments shape 
adherence to the global standards embodied in private transnational governance regimes.  We 
find that the domestic institutional environments most hospitable to the imposition of global 26 
 
labor standards through private codes of conduct are those that have substantial connections to 
the international community, as evidenced by their many treaty obligations, and those that 
maintain high levels of press freedom.  We find, further, that the effects of these institutions are 
amplified when they are layered with other public and private governance institutions.  That is, 
treaties significantly shape domestic environments in their own right, but their effect on code 
compliance is enhanced in countries that also have a stringent employment law regime.  
Similarly, while press freedom is highly predictive of code compliance, its effect is even more 
pronounced in countries with many INGOs.  Finally, we find that institutions in the global 
buyer’s country are associated with conditions in their suppliers’ factories.  TNCs in countries 
where the issue of supply-chain labor abuse is particularly salient work with factories that tend to 
be more compliant with the global labor standards embodied in private codes of conduct.  Taken 
together, these findings make three key contributions to the literature and point the way toward 
improving working conditions in global supply chains and building more effective transnational 
regulatory regimes. 
First, we go beyond the transnational regulation literature’s consensus that states matter 
to show how they matter.  Global labor standards were most successfully implemented in states 
that made significant formal and binding connections to the international community through 
their treaty ratifications and reinforced these connections by enacting stringent domestic 
employment legislation.  By maintaining a free press, states also play a key role in promoting 
adherence to global standards.  Thus, states are important not only for their exercise of traditional 
governmental functions, such as diplomacy and lawmaking, but also for their role in enabling 
civil society actors, such as the press, to exert regulatory effects. 27 
 
Second, we demonstrate that the effects of different public, private, domestic, and 
international regulatory institutions are “interactive, not additive” (King, 2008:396) and that they 
are context-specific.  The literature on regulation by civil society actors correctly observes that 
there are multiple actors capable of playing regulatory roles, especially in the international 
sphere (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Braithwaite, 1997; Sabel and Simon, 2012).  However, a subtext running through this literature is 
that these governance institutions can serve as substitutes or backstops for one another.  Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992), for instance, in their classic articulation of “tripartism,” argue that when 
no government regulator is available to monitor and enforce compliance, public interest groups 
can act as a “proxy for the state” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992:132).  INGO monitoring 
campaigns are often conceived as “an alternative to inadequate state enforcement” (Seidman 
2007:124).  Studies often portray INGOs stepping in to provide governance functions where the 
state lacks the will or capacity to do so (Chng, 2012).  Our research challenges the implicit 
assumption that private governance regimes can serve as a substitute for state governance.  In our 
findings, the presence of INGOs, for instance, had no independent effect on code compliance, 
but mattered only in states that maintained substantial press freedom.  Moreover, the impact of 
INGO presence varied with the development levels of different countries.   
Similarly, our findings highlight the frequently observed synergies between domestic and 
international legal regimes (Simmons, 2009; Kelley, 2007).  The stringency of domestic 
employment law had no independent effect on code compliance, but it appears to be a crucial 
vehicle for implementing the global labor norms embodied in international treaty regimes.  These 
findings support the arguments of those who have theorized that meaningful transnational 
regulation must weave together regulatory regimes operating “at many levels and across borders, 28 
 
deploying private rules, local practices, national laws, supranational forums, and international 
law in the interest of effective protection of workers and their rights” (Trubek, Mosher, and 
Rothstein, 2000:1193).  Our findings also underscore the importance of recent calls for more 
research on the interaction of governance regimes regulating transnational business activities 
(Eberlein et al., 2012). 
Finally, we offer the first evidence suggesting that political pressures in TNCs’ home 
markets might have a substantive impact on working conditions in foreign supply chains, an 
impact that goes beyond the symbolic rhetoric of code adoption.  Although many studies 
document how stakeholder pressures in a buyer’s domestic market can encourage it to adopt 
codes of conduct and other CSR activities (Fransen, 2012; King, 2008; Lenox and Eesley, 2009; 
Peretti and Micheletti, 2004), we are not aware of any studies that assess whether these measures 
were implemented effectively.  Similarly, although studies have documented the effects that 
activist tactics such as shaming and boycotts have on outcomes that TNCs care about, such as 
stock price and earnings (Vasi and King, 2012; King and Soule, 2007), we are aware of none that 
investigate whether there is any connection between domestic institutional pressures on TNCs 
and working conditions in their supply chains.  We show that domestic conditions that raise 
public awareness of supply-chain labor abuse in a TNC’s home country are indeed associated 
with better compliance in that company’s supply chains.  This provides some support for private 
political approaches that seek to mobilize consumers and other stakeholders to directly target 
corporations.  However, future research is necessary to determine whether particular anti-
corporate campaigns, rather than merely the conditions that might enable them, have produced 
better supply chain conditions. 29 
 
Taken together, these findings point the way toward building more effective private 
transnational regulatory regimes.  We find that codes of conduct are most effective when they are 
embedded in states that have made binding domestic and international legal commitments to 
protect workers’ rights and that have high levels of press freedom and nongovernmental 
organization activity.  This research suggests the danger of assuming that one type of regulatory 
regime can substitute for another that has failed and reveals the critical importance of 
maintaining multiple, robust, overlapping, and reinforcing governance systems.   
References 
Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 2009. “Strengthening international regulation through 
transnational new governance: Overcoming the orchestration deficit.” Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 42: 501-578. 
Ayres, Ian, and John Braithwaite. 1992. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Banerjee, Subhabrata Bobby. 2007. Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Baron, David. 2003. "Private politics." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 12(1): 31-
66. 
Bartley, Tim. 2007a. “How foundations shape social movements: the construction of an 
organizational field and the rise of forest certification.” Social Problems 54(3): 229-255. 
Bartley, Tim. 2007b. “Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: The rise of transnational 
private regulation of labor and environmental conditions.” American Journal of 
Sociology 113(2): 297-351. 
Bartley, Tim. 2010. “Transnational private regulation in practice: The limits of forest and labor 
standards certification in Indonesia.” Business and Politics 12(3): Article 7. 
Bernstein, Steven, and Benjamin Cashore. 2007. “Can non-state global governance be 
legitimate? An analytical framework.” Regulation and Governance 1(2): 347-371. 
Botero, Juan, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei 
Shleifer. 2004. “The regulation of labor.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(4): 1339-
1382. 
Braithwaite, John. 1997. “On speaking softly and carrying big sticks: Neglected dimensions of a 
republication separation of powers.” University of Toronto Law Journal 47(3): 305-361. 
Büthe, Tim. 2010. “Global private politics: A research agenda.” Business and Politics 12(3): 
Article 12. 30 
 
Campbell, John. 2007. “Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An 
Institutional theory of corporate social responsibility.” Academy of Management Review 
32(3): 946-967. 
Chatterji, Aaron, and Siona Listokin. 2007. “Corporate social irresponsibility.” Democracy: A 
Journal of Ideas (3): 52-63. 
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Chayes. 1995. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Chng, N. R. 2012. “Regulatory mobilization and service delivery at the edge of the regulatory 
state.” Regulation & Governance forthcoming. 
Courville, Sasha. 2003. “Social accountability audits: Challenging or defending democratic 
governance?” Law & Policy 25(3): 269-297. 
Drahos, Peter, and John Braithwaite. 2001. “The globalisation of regulation.” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 9(1): 103-128. 
Dyck, Alexander, and Luigi Zingales. 2002. “The Corporate Governance Role of the Media.” 
NBER Working Paper No. 9309. 
Eberlein, Burkard, Kenneth W. Abbott, Julia Black, Errol Meidinger, and Stepan Wood. 2012. 
“Transnational business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for 
analysis.” Regulation & Governance forthcoming. 
Eesley, Charles, and Michael J. Lenox. 2006. “Firm responses to secondary stakeholder action.” 
Strategic Management Journal 27(8): 765-782.  
Esbenshade, Jill. 2004. Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, Consumers, and the Global Apparel 
Industry.  Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Fransen, Luc. 2012. Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Labor Standards: Firms and 
Activists in the Making of Private Regulation. New York: Routledge. 
Fung, Archon, Dara O’Rourke, and Charles Sabel. 2001. Can We Put an End to Sweatshops? 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
George, Erika R. 2007. “The place of the private transnational actor in international law: Human 
rights norms, development aims, and understanding corporate self-regulation as soft 
law.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting [American Society of International Law] 101: 
473-476. 
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner. 2005. The Limits of International Law. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. 2004. “How to influence states: Socialization and 
international human rights law.” Duke Law Journal 54(3): 621-704. 
Greenfield, Gerard. 1997. “Codes of conduct and Carmelita: The real gap.” CorpWatch website, 
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=3030, last viewed May 26, 2011. 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. “Human rights in a globalizing world: 
The paradox of empty promises.” American Journal of Sociology 110(5): 1373-1411. 
Hathaway, Oona A. 2005. “Between power and principle: An integrated theory of international 
law.” University of Chicago Law Review 72(2): 469-536. 31 
 
Hendry, Jamie. 2006. “Taking aim at business: What factors lead environmental non-
governmental organizations to target particular firms?” Business & Society 45: 47-86. 
Hoffman, Andrew J. 2001. From Heresy to Dogma: An Institutional History of Corporate 
Environmentalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Jenkins, Rhys. 2001. “Corporate codes of conduct: Self-regulation in a global economy.” UN 
Research Institute for Social Development, Technology, Business and Society 
Programme, Paper Number 2. 
Jira, Chonnikarn (Fern), and Michael W. Toffel. 2013. “Engaging supply chains in climate 
change.” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management forthcoming. 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Kelley, Judith. 2007. “Who keeps international commitments and why? The international 
criminal court and bilateral nonsurrender agreements.” American Political Science 
Review 101(3): 573-589. 
King, Brayden G. 2008. “A political mediation model of corporate response to social movement 
activism.” Administrative Science Quarterly 53: 395-421. 
King, Brayden G., and Sarah A. Soule. 2007. “Social movements as extra-institutional 
entrepreneurs: The effect of protest on stock price returns.” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 52: 413-442. 
Klandermans, Bert, and Sjoerd Goslinga. 1996. “Media discourse, movement publicity, and the 
generation of collective action frames: Theoretical and empirical exercises in meaning 
Construction.” In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald (eds.), Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Cultural Framings: 312-337. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Klein, Naomi. 2002. No Logo: No Space, No Choice, No Jobs. New York: Picador. 
Kocer, Gokhan Ruya, and Luc Fransen. 2009. “Codes of Conduct and the Promise of a Change 
of Climate in Worker Organization.” European Journal of Industrial Relations 15(3): 
237-256. 
Kolk, Ans, and Rob van Tulder. 2005. “Setting new global rules? TNCs and codes of conduct.” 
Transnational Corporations 14(3): 1-27. 
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2011. The Politics of International Law. Oxford, UK: Hart. 
Lenox, Michael, and Charles Eesley. 2009. “Private environmental activism and the selection 
and response of firm targets.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 18(1): 45-
73. 
Lim, Alwyn, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2012. “Globalization and commitment in corporate social 
responsibility: Cross-national analyses of institutional and political-economy effects.” 
American Sociological Review 77: 69-98. 
Locke, Richard M., Fei Qin, and Alberto Brause. 2007. “Does Monitoring Improve Labor 
Standards? Lessons from Nike.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 61(1): 3-31. 
Locke, Richard M., Ben A. Rissing, and Timea Pal. 2012. “Complements or substitutes? Private 
codes, state regulation and the improvement of labor standards in global Supply chains.” 
MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2012-2. 32 
 
Locke, Richard, and Monica Romis. 2007. “Improving work conditions in a global supply 
chain.” Sloan Management Review 48(2): 54-62. 
Low, Kevin, Arumugan Seetharaman, and Wai Ching Poon. 2002. “The sustainability of 
business corporate governance: Evidence from publicly listed companies in Malaysia.” 
Multimedia University, Faculty of Management, Cyberjaya, Malaysia. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=294577.  
Lyon, Thomas P., and John W. Maxwell. 2007. “Environmental public voluntary programs 
reconsidered.” Policy Studies Journal 35(4): 723-750. 
Margolis, Joshua D., and James P. Walsh. 2003. “Misery loves companies: Rethinking social 
initiatives by business.” Administrative Science Quarterly 48(2): 268-305. 
McBarnet, Doreen. 2007. “Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: The 
new corporate accountability.” In D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, and T. Campbell (eds.), 
The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law: 9-56. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
McBarnet, Doreen, and Marina Kurkchiyan. 2007. “Corporate social responsibility through 
contractual control? Global supply chains and ‘other-regulation.’”  In D. McBarnet, A. 
Voiculescu, and T. Campbell (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the Law: 59-92. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
McCaffrey, D. P., and D. W. Hart. 1998. Wall Street Polices Itself: How Securities Firms 
Manage the Legal Hazards of Competitive Pressures. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
McCarthy, John D., Jackie Smith, and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. “Public, media, electoral, 
governmental agendas.” In D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald (eds.), 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Cultural Framings: 291-311. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
McCombs, Maxwell E., and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. “The Agenda setting function of the mass 
media.” Public Opinion Quarterly 36: 176-187. 
Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. “World 
Society and the Nation-State.” American Journal of Sociology 103: 144-181. 
Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. “Institutional organizations: formal structure as myth 
and ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340-363. 
Moon, Jeremy, and David Vogel. 2008. “Corporate social responsibility, government, and civil 
society.” In Andrew Crane, Abagail McWilliams, Dirk Matten, Jeremy Moon, and 
Donald S. Siegel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility: 303-
323. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
O’Rourke, Dara. 2003. “Outsourcing regulation: Analyzing nongovernmental systems of labor 
standards and monitoring.” Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1-29. 
Orts, Eric W. 1995. “Reflexive Environmental Law.” Northwestern Law Review 89: 1227-1340. 
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1989. “Educating and manipulating the public.” In 
Michael Margolis and Gary A. Mauser (eds.), Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on 
Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable: 294-320. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 33 
 
Parker, Christine. 2002. The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Peretti, Jonah, and Michele Micheletti. 2004. “The Nike sweatshop email: Political 
consumerism, internet, and culture jamming.” In Michele Micheletti, Andreas Follesdal, 
and Dietlind Stolle (eds.), Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political 
Consumerism Past and Present: 127-142. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Pfeifer, M. C., Jr., J. L. Stefanski, and C. B. Grether. 1976. Psychological, Behavioral and 
Organizational Factors Affecting Coal Miner Safety and Health. Columbia, MD: 
Westinghouse Behavioral Sciences Center. 
Potoski, Matthew, and Aseem Prakash. 2005. “Green clubs and voluntary governance: ISO 
14001 and firms’ regulatory compliance.” American Journal of Political Science 49: 235-
248. 
Power, Michael. 1997. The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Prakash, Aseem, and Matthew Potoski. 2006. “Racing to the bottom? Trade, environmental 
governance, and ISO 14001.” American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 350-364. 
Rees, Joe V. 1988. Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Safety. 
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Reid, Erin M., and Michael W. Toffel. 2009. “Responding to public and private politics: 
Corporate disclosure of climate change Strategies.” Strategic Management Journal 
30(11): 1157-1178. 
Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1999. “The socialization of international human rights 
norms into domestic practice: Introduction.” In Thomas Risse, Steve C. Ropp, and 
Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change: 1-38. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rivera, Jorge. 2004. “Institutional Pressures and voluntary environmental behavior in developing 
countries: Evidence from Costa Rica.” Society and Natural Resources 17: 779-797. 
Rivera, Jorge, Peter DeLeon, and C. Koerber. 2006. “Is greener whiter yet? The Sustainable 
Slopes Program after Five Years.” Policy Studies Journal 34(2): 195-221. 
Rodríguez-Garavito, César. 2005. “Global governance and labor rights: Codes of conduct and 
anti-sweatshop struggles in global apparel factories in Mexico and Guatemala.” Politics 
& Society 33(2): 203-233. 
Ruggie, John G. 2003. “Taking embedded liberalism global: The corporate connection.” In D. 
Held and M. Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance: 
93-129. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Ruggie, John. 2010. “The UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework for Business and 
Human Rights.”  Document is at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-protect-
respect-remedy-framework.pdf and can be accessed through the United Nations Business 
& Human Rights Resource Center at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home. 
Sabel, Charles F., and William H. Simon. 2012. “Contextualizing regimes: Institutionalization as 
a response to the limits of interpretation and policy engineering.” Michigan Law Review 
110: 1265-1308. 34 
 
Sachleben, Mark. 2006. Human Rights Treaties: Considering Patterns of Participation, 1948-
2000. New York: Routledge. 
Schmidt, William, and Ananth Raman. 2012. “When supply-chain disruptions matter.” Harvard 
Business School Working Paper No. 13-006.  
Schrage, Elliot J. 2004. “Promoting international worker rights through private voluntary 
initiatives: Public relations or public policy? A Report to the U.S. Department of State on 
Behalf of the University of Iowa Center for Human Rights.” Iowa City, IA: University of 
Iowa Center for Human Rights. 
Scott, Colin. 2010. “Regulatory governance and the challenge of constitutionalism.” In D. 
Oliver, T. Prosser, and R. Rawlings (eds.), Regulation After the Regulatory State: 15-33.  
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Seidman, Gay. 2007. Beyond the Boycott: Labor Rights, Human Rights, and Transnational 
Activism. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Selznick, Phillip. 1992. The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of 
Community. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Shamir, Ronen. 2005. “Corporate social responsibility: A case of hegemony and counter-
hegemony.” In B. de Sousa Santos and C. A. Rodríguez-Garavito (eds.), Law and 
Globalization from Below: 92-117. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Short, Jodi L., and Michael W. Toffel. 2008. “Coerced confessions: Self-policing in the shadow 
of the regulator.” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 24(1): 45-71. 
Short, Jodi L., and Michael W. Toffel. 2010. “Making Self-regulation more than merely 
symbolic: The critical role of the legal environment.” Administrative Science Quarterly 
55(3): 361-396. 
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1988. “Ideology, frame resonance and participant 
mobilization.” In B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, and S. Tarrow (eds.), From Structure to 
Action: Comparing Movement Participation across Cultures, International Social 
Movement Research, 1: 197-218. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. 
“Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation.” American 
Sociological Review 51(4): 464-481. 
Soule, Sarah. 2009. Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Suchman, Mark C. 1995. “Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches.” 
Academy of Management Review 20: 571-610. 
Szasz, Andrew. 1994. Ecopopulism: Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental Justice. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Toffel, Michael W. 2008. “Resolving Information Asymmetries in Markets: The Role of 
Certified Management Programs.” Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 07-023. 35 
 
Toffel, Michael W., and Jodi L. Short. 2011. “Coming clean and cleaning up: does voluntary 
self-reporting indicate effective self-policing.” Journal of Law & Economics 54(3): 609-
649. 
Trubek, David, Jim Mosher, and Jeffrey Rothstein. 2000. “Transnationalism in the regulation of 
labor relations: International regimes and transnational advocacy networks.” Law & 
Social Inquiry 25:1187-1211. 
Tsutsui, Kiyoteru, and Christine Min Wotipka. 2004. “Global civil society and the international 
human rights movement: Citizen participation in human rights international 
nongovernmental organizations.” Social Forces 83(2): 587-620. 
Union of International Associations. 2004 to 2009. Yearbook of International Organizations. 
Various issues. München: KG Saur Verlag. 
Vasi, Ion Bogdan, and Brayden G. King. 2012. “Social movements, risk perceptions, and 
economic outcomes: The effect of primary and secondary stakeholder activism on firms’ 
perceived environmental risk and financial performance.” American Sociological Review 
77(4): 573-596. 
Vogel, David. 2008. “Private global business regulation.” Annual Review of Political Science 11: 
261-282. 
Vogel, David. 2010. “The private regulation of global corporate conduct: Achievement and 
limitations.” Business and Society 49(1): 68-87. 
Wagner, Stephen, and Lee Dittmar. 2006. “The unexpected benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley.” 
Harvard Business Review 84(4): 133-140.  
Wetterberg, Anna Marie. 2011. Catching Codes: The Institutionalization of Private Labor 
Regulation in the Global Apparel Industry. Proquest, UMI Dissertation Publishing. 
Wingfield, Nick. 2012. “Fixing Apple’s supply lines: The Successor to Steve Jobs Puts His 
Stamp on Labor Issues.” New York Times (April 2): B1. 
World Bank. 2011. “Worldwide Governance Indicators.” World Bank website, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm, accessed January 2012. 
Zald, Meyer N. 1996. “Culture, ideology, and strategic framing.” In Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings: 261-274. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 36 
 
Table 1. Number of audits by factory country and client country 
 
Panel A. Audits by factory location (43 countries) 
Africa (5 countries)  280  
Americas (12 countries) 3,081  
United States  2,066 
Mexico  410 
Other   605 
Asia (16 countries)  27,948  
China (including Hong Kong) 20,949 
Bangladesh  1,345 
India  1,241 
Vietnam  986 
Indonesia  500 
Thailand  488 
Taiwan  475 
Pakistan  399 
Philippines  395 
Sri Lanka  312 
Other   858 
Europe (10 countries) 606
Total  31,915
 
Panel B. Audits by client location (33 countries) 
Americas (6 countries) 22,272
United States  22,135 
Other  137 
Asia (13 countries)  1,887
China (including Hong Kong and Macao) 1,601 
Other  286 
Europe (12 countries) 6,388
Germany  4,433 
United Kingdom  1,102 
France  506 
Other  347 
Unknown  1,368  
Total  31,915  
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Table 2. Industry composition 
 
Industry Establishments   Audits 
Accessories  2,237 15% 4,876 15% 
Building materials  477 3% 1,076 3% 
Chemicals and plastics 297 2% 513 2% 
Electronics  787 5% 1,901 6% 
Food, agriculture, beverage 607 4% 955 3% 
Footwear  495 3% 1,035 3% 
Furniture  691 5% 1,349 4% 
Garments  7,840 53% 17,323 54% 
Metal products  250 2% 557 2% 
Paper, printing, publishing 578 4% 973 3% 
Services 126 1% 200 1% 
Toys  537 4% 1,157 4% 
Total  14,922 31,915
 
 
Table 3. Countries’ labor treaty participation and employment law index 
 
   Number of labor treaties 
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Canada   
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Colombia   
Israel   
Japan   
Morocco   
Pakistan   
Romania   
Argentina   
Egypt   
United Kingdom 
 
 38 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean SD  Min Max 
Number of labor violations   7.00  6.40  0.00  28.00 
Employment  laws  index  0.40 0.13 0.00 0.82 
Employment laws index ◊  0.00 0.13  -0.40 0.41 
Number of labor treaties (log)  3.17  0.68  0.00  4.88 
Number of labor treaties (log) ◊  -0.01 0.68  -3.17 1.71 
International  nongovernmental  organizations  (log)  7.37 0.42 5.03 8.36 
International nongovernmental organizations (log) ◊    0.01 0.42  -2.33 1.00 
Press  freedom  0.36 0.28 0.00 0.98 
Press freedom ◊    -0.04 0.28  -0.41 0.57 
Issue salience in buyer country  4.57  2.73  0.00  6.47 
GDP per capita (log)  7.88  1.08  5.69  10.68 
Government effectiveness index  0.20  0.54  -0.89  1.94 
OECD  0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Audit  paid  by  buyer  0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Audit paid by vendor, agent, or licensee  0.40  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Third-party  audit  protocol  0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Audit  staff  hours  (log)  0.21 0.23 0.00 2.64 
 
Panel B. Correlations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
(1) Number of labor violations   1.00
(2) Employment laws index  0.08 1.00
(3) Number of labor treaties (log)  0.06 0.26 1.00
(4) International nongovernmental organizations (log)  -0.02 0.25 0.25 1.00
(5) Press freedom  -0.26 -0.27 -0.11 0.18 1.00
(6) Issue salience in buyer country  -0.21 0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.10 1.00
(7) GDP per capita (log)  -0.19 -0.15 -0.39 0.48 0.52 0.17 1.00 
(8) Government effectiveness index  -0.17 -0.17 -0.47 0.47 0.49 0.18 0.94  1.00 
(9) OECD  -0.18 -0.17 0.06 0.48 0.65 0.14 0.77  0.69  1.00
(10) Audit paid by buyer  0.08 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.29 0.03  0.04  0.06 1.00
(11) Audit paid by vendor, agent, or licensee  -0.08 0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.32 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.78 1.00
(12) Third-party audit protocol  0.16 0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.65 -0.09  -0.10  -0.10 0.30 -0.30 1.00
(13) Audit staff hours  (log)  0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.15 -0.08  -0.06  -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.33
 
Notes: N = 31,915 audits for both panels. ◊ indicates centered variables. 
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Table 5. Regression results 
Dependent variable: Number of labor violations 
 
(1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
      Coef.  AME  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
H1  Employment laws index ◊  0.582 4.10 0.685 0.550 0.580 
[0.500] [0.445]  [0.478]  [0.421] 
H2  Number of labor treaties (log) ◊ -0.199**  -1.40  -0.120+  -0.226**  -0.249** 
[0.074] [0.067]  [0.077]  [0.068] 
H3  Employment laws index ◊  Number of labor treaties (log) ◊  -0.851** 
[0.134] 
H4  International nongovernmental organizations (log) ◊  0.192* 1.35  0.190* 0.250* 0.283** 
[0.095] [0.085]  [0.111]  [0.104] 
H5 Press  freedom  index  ◊  -0.921** -6.49  -0.946** -0.908** -0.834** 
[0.087] [0.087]  [0.097]  [0.089] 
H6  International nongovernmental organizations (log) ◊   -0.678* 
    Press freedom index◊  [0.307] 
H7  Issue salience in buyer country  -0.194** -1.36  -0.195** -0.196** -0.196** 
[0.037] [0.036]  [0.036]  [0.036] 
International nongovernmental organizations (log) ◊  OECD  -0.892** 
[0.194] 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.181**  -1.27  -0.183**  -0.244**  -0.157** 
[0.044] [0.047]  [0.061]  [0.047] 
Government effectiveness index  0.170  1.20  0.268+  0.237  0.203 
[0.151] [0.142]  [0.149]  [0.138] 
OECD  0.207 1.46 0.200 0.435+  0.479** 
[0.163] [0.149]  [0.231]  [0.177] 
Audit paid by buyer  0.349**  2.46  0.347**  0.354**  0.355** 
[0.033] [0.035]  [0.031]  [0.030] 
Audit paid by vendor, agent, or licensee  0.220**  1.55  0.213**  0.221**  0.220** 
[0.048] [0.053]  [0.048]  [0.048] 
Third-party audit protocol  0.092*  0.65  0.088**  0.092*  0.092* 
[0.036] [0.034]  [0.036]  [0.036] 
Audit  staff  hours  1.270** 8.94  1.247** 1.273** 1.264** 
[0.110] [0.117]  [0.109]  [0.113] 
Year dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included  Included 
For all models, N = 31,915 audits of 14,922 establishments. Negative binomial coefficients or average marginal effects (AME), 
with standard errors clustered by the establishment’s country in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. ◊ indicates centered 
variables. Audit paid by factory is the omitted category. All models also include dummy variables denoting instances in which the 
following variables were recoded from missing to zero: number of labor treaties, employment laws index, press freedom index, 
issue salience in buyer country, and audit staff hours. 
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Figure 1.  Distribution of number of labor violations per audit 
 
Figure 2.  Suppliers have  fewer labor code violations in countries with more labor  
treaties, especially when accompanied by more protective domestic employment 
law 
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Figure 3.  Suppliers have fewer labor code violations in countries with more press freedom, 
especially in the presence of more international nongovernmental organizations  
 
Figure 4:  More international nongovernmental organizations is associated with fewer 
labor code violations in developed countries but with more violations in 
developing countries.  
 
2
4
6
8
10
12
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Press freedom index (centered)
Below median INGOs Above median INGOs
0
10
20
30
40
50
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
v
i
o
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
International nongovernmental organizations (log) (centered)
Developing countries (non-OECD) Developed countries (OECD members)